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As the financial crisis threatens to lead to a depression, the woes 
of the automobile industry are second only to the distress of the 
financial sector. Employment in the US auto industry dropped 
9 percent between 2007 and 2008, with much more to follow 
in 2009. Overall, US auto sales dropped 18 percent between 
2007 and 2008, and sales of SUVs plunged 44 percent on a 
year-over-year basis.1 Since some sort of financing is required for 
90 percent of US car sales, the global credit freeze hit the auto 
industry with a second blow. 
The  “Big  Three”  Detroit  automakers—General  Motors 
(GM), Chrysler, and Ford—were particularly hard hit. Chrysler 
and GM are in dire shape. Ford may be able to make it through 
the  storm  without  government  aid,  but  large  fourth-quarter 
losses ($5.9 billion) make for tough going. Forecasts for 2009 
suggest that US auto-industry sales will drop an additional 24 
percent year over year (Standard & Poor’s 2009). 
In November 2008, as the economy deteriorated, the Big 
1. In the closing months of 2008, SUV sales picked up a bit, partly due to the sharp 
drop in gasoline prices from around $4 a gallon over the summer to under $2. 
Three appealed to the government for financial aid. Their argu-
ment was straightforward: They were “too big to fail.” The Big 
Three accounted for close to 50 percent of total US auto sales in 
2008 (Cooney 2009). If the Three file for bankruptcy proceedings, 
many auto-parts firms will collapse, with domino effects through-
out the US economy and abroad. The Big Three account for nearly 
240,000 jobs; double the figure of foreign automakers (around 
115,000). Further, the auto industry is highly concentrated in a 
few states and represents almost 30 percent of all manufacturing 
employment in Michigan. The Center for Automobile Research 
estimates that a 50 percent reduction in the US operations of the 
Big Three would lead to a loss of 2.5 million jobs in direct, indi-
rect, and spinoff employment in 2009 (Cole et al. 2008).
While the industry’s troubles were exposed and worsened 
by the financial crisis, the problems have a long-term structural 
character. Among the Big Three, corporate debt reached unsus-
tainable levels—$62 billion in the case of GM. Labor costs are 
extremely high. While the total labor cost of a Toyota worker in 
the United States is roughly $35 an hour, the figure is $59 an 
hour for the Big Three due to pension and health obligations 
and the jobs bank.2 Finally, sales were artificially boosted in the 
past few years with zero–down payment, zero-interest financing 
schemes.3 Many of the vehicles sold were SUVs, which have low 
fuel efficiency and high CO2 emissions.
The Bush and Obama administrations and the US Congress 
have debated several measures for the auto industry: an outright 
bailout for GM and Chrysler, using the Troubled Assets Relief 
Program  (TARP)  to  assist  the  financing  arms  of  those  two 
automakers; a “Cash for Clunkers” scheme to encourage the 
purchase of newer, more fuel-efficient vehicles; a tax credit for 
new purchases; and a bailout for auto-parts firms. As various 
plans take shape, they have provoked concerns both at home and 
abroad about their consistency with the rules of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Meanwhile, other countries are drafting 
2. John D Stoll, “Ten Hard Questions Facing the ‘Car Czar,’” Wall Street Journal, 
January 22, 2009. The jobs bank is a job-security program that continues to pay 
union workers 100 percent of their salaries even if they are out of work.
3. Despite this boost, the average fleet age for cars rose from 7.9 years in 1997 to 
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their own assistance programs. This Policy Brief examines the 
measures being considered in the United States and abroad 
and considers whether they would violate WTO rules. 
US AUTO MEASURES
Bailout for the Big Three
GM and Chrysler have received $6 billion and $1.5 billion, 
respectively, from the TARP. The TARP funds were directed 
toward the financing arms of each company, GMAC LLC and 
Chrysler Financial. GMAC is the primary source of loans for 
buyers of GM cars. GMAC’s application to become a bank-
holding company was approved by the Federal Reserve on 
December 25, 2008. How GMAC will raise the capital needed 
to maintain this status is uncertain. 
On December 10, 2008, the US House of Representa-
tives passed the Auto Industry Financing and Restructuring 
Act. The bill, if passed by the Senate and signed by the presi-
dent, would have approved $17.4 billion in loans for GM and 
Chrysler in two steps: $13.4 billion would be dispensed when 
enacted, with another $4 billion for GM (but not Chrysler) 
in February 2009.4 The money comes from funds previously 
appropriated to Section 136 of the Energy Independence and 
Security Act.5 The loans are bridge loans until March 31, 2009. 
If the loans become permanent, they will have to be paid back 
within seven years, with a 5 percent interest rate over the first 
five years, and a 9 percent rate over the last two years. 
The bill would also create a “car czar,” who would be 
appointed by the president to oversee restructuring in those 
companies that receive funds. However, the administration 
is now looking to create a Presidential Task Force on Autos, 
4. At the time of writing, GM and Chrysler are asking for an additional $20 
billion combined, but the funds have not yet been agreed. 
5. The program in question is known as the Advanced Technology Vehicles 
Manufacturing Incentive Program. Democratic leaders, including Speaker 
of the House Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid 
(D-NV), originally opposed using the Section 136 funds in this way, as those 
funds were intended for investments on research and development. The 
Democrats were forced to accept this source of support, however, due to the 
Bush administration’s strict refusal to use TARP funds.
headed by “car czars” Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner 
and Chief Economic Adviser Lawrence Summers.6 
Finally, the bill would guarantee super seniority of the 
Section 136 loan above all other debt (see appendix for more 
detail) and limits executive compensation. Last but not least, 
restructuring plans will not be approved unless they comply 
with  applicable  requirements  for  fuel  efficiency  and  CO2 
emissions. 
Fuel Efficiency and Emissions Standards
On January 26, 2009, in a break from the Bush administra-
tion on environmental policies, President Obama announced 
that he would instruct the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to grant California a waiver from federal rules so that 
the state could implement its own tougher emissions standards 
for cars. Many other states will follow California’s lead. Thus 
California’s standards will set the bar for the entire country, 
since automakers will not want to make two models of each 
car, one model for California and its followers, and another for 
the rest of the states. The bailout requirements and California’s 
emissions standards seek to move production toward smaller, 
more fuel-efficient cars. Current production emphasizes SUVs 
and pickup trucks, which are more profitable than small, fuel-
efficient cars.7 The goal of public policy is to shift the balance 
in the other direction.
This shift, however, will be difficult, and US carmakers 
claim the automobile industry cannot handle such a drastic 
change in the current economic climate. These claims find some 
support in Congress. House Minority Leader John Boehner 
(R-OH) asserted that the waiver for California’s standards will 
“destroy American jobs.” Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) argued 
that California’s standards would hurt the competitiveness of 
US automakers: “As the California standard is currently draft-
ed, it is discriminatory against US-made vehicles of the same 
efficiency as the imports.”8 If the EPA does grant California 
the ability to set its own stricter emissions standards, the Big 
Three will likely contest the EPA’s decision when it arrives. 
Developing a new car, even without a special focus on 
the environmental angle, requires an investment of around $1 
billion. Developing a fuel-efficient, low-emissions car will be 
even more expensive. But the Big Three will not be competi-
6. James R. Healey, “Does Auto Task Force Trump A Car Czar?” USA Today, 
February 17, 2009. 
7. Mike Spector and Joseph B. White, “Auto Bailout Caps Flawed Relation-
ship,” Wall Street Journal, December 22, 2009. Profits amount to roughly 
$8,000 per truck.
8. Mike Lillis, “Study Contradicts Auto Makers’ Emission Claims,” 
Washington Independent, January 28, 2009.
[A] 50 percent reduction in the  
US operations of the Big Three would 
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tive until they achieve this goal. As President Obama put the 
matter, the “goal is not to further burden an already struggling 
industry. It is to help America’s automakers prepare for the 
future.”9 Japanese competitors Nissan and Toyota have already 
developed electric cars; so has US newcomer Tesla Motors. 
European auto firms BMW of Germany and Fiat of Italy have 
invested significant amounts in the development of small cars, 
motivated by high fuel prices, which reflect a history of higher 
gas taxes throughout the European Union. These firms are 
now developing low-emission technologies fast, as they face 
strict European CO2 standards starting in 2015. 
In  addition  to  the  bailout  aid,  the  US  government 
unblocked further funds to help the auto industry meet envi-
ronmental standards. The Energy Independence and Security 
Act of 2007, which launched the Advanced Technology Vehi-
cles Manufacturing Incentive Program, provided a $25 billion 
loan program for the auto industry to support the develop-
ment of fuel-efficient cars in the United States. GM applied 
for $8.3 billion; Ford is seeking $5 billion; and Tesla is asking 
for $450 million. On February 9, 2009, Nissan became the 
first foreign car company to ask for the funds.10 
Restructuring Outlook
Under proposed legislation, GM has until February 17, 2009, 
to  show  progress  on  restructuring  in  order  for  the  federal 
loans to be made permanent. Some, like United Auto Workers 
(UAW) President Ron Gettelfinger, worry that “this timeline is 
almost unattainable.”11 The terms of the restructuring involve 
cutting 31,000 jobs, restructuring GM debt, eliminating the 
jobs  bank,  and  closing  1,750  dealerships  and  nine  plants 
(though GM may close more due to the 49 percent decline 
in sales in January 2009).12 GM and the UAW came to an 
agreement to close the jobs bank on February 2, 2009. Those 
leaving the program will receive state unemployment benefits 
and  some  compensation  from  GM.  The  amount,  which  is 
currently being negotiated with the UAW, should be around 
72 percent of full pay, down from 100 percent in the jobs 
bank. Although GM has only 1,600 workers in the jobs bank, 
the program has become a symbol of restructuring.
Even  with  the  loan,  Chrysler’s  hopes  of  survival  seem 
small. The firm’s ranking in the collective view of auto buyers 
9. Ken Thomas, H. Josef Hebert, Dina Cappiello, and Erica Werner, “Obama 
orders push to cleaner, more efficient cars,” Associated Press, January 26, 2009.
10. Alan Ohnsman and Tina Seeley, “Nissan Vies with GM for US Energy 
Department Loan,” Bloomberg.com, February 9, 2009. 
11. David Shepardson, “UAW: Auto plans need more time,” Detroit News, 
January 20, 2009.
12. Sharon Terlep, Kate Linebaugh, and Jeff Bennett, “More Car Plants at 
Risk,” Wall Street Journal, February 7, 2009. 
has sunk. The influential publication Consumer Reports does 
not recommend any Chrysler vehicles. The firm has no foreign 
subsidiaries and relies almost entirely on the North American 
market. Chrysler closed its jobs bank on January 26, 2009. Its 
surest bet right now is to have its best brands—Jeep, Chrysler, 
and Dodge minivans—acquired by another company.13 Italian 
carmaker Fiat is in talks to acquire 35 percent of the company 
in exchange for access to Chrysler’s small-car platforms and 
its global dealer network.14 However, Fiat is not offering cash, 
which is what Chrysler desperately needs. Fiat has made the 
package conditional on Chrysler getting $3 billion in addi-
tional loans from the US Treasury. 
Cash for Clunkers
Another measure being considered in Congress is the National 
Incentive Program for Voluntary Retirement of Fuel-Ineffi-
cient Vehicles, better known as Cash for Clunkers. The aim of 
the program is to accelerate fuel savings nationwide by provid-
ing an incentive to owners of older, gas-guzzling cars to trade 
them  in  for  more  fuel-efficient  models.  Conditions  apply 
both on the cars that can be traded in and the standards for 
newly acquired cars (see appendix for details). Eligible drivers 
would receive a reimbursement voucher for the purchase of 
a new car or conforming used vehicle. If the vehicle traded 
in  was  made  before  1998,  the  voucher  would  amount  to 
$2,000, while the vouchers for vehicles made between 1998 
and 2001 would be $3,000 and for any vehicle made after 
2001,  $4,500.  The  voucher  could  also  be  used  for  public 
transportation. The program would run from 2009 to 2012. 
The legislation attempts to set voucher amounts high enough 
to encourage consumers to trade in their inefficient cars at a 
faster pace than the normal renewal rate—that is, the rate at 
which people would trade in their old cars regardless of the 
program. Congress and the Big Three are currently discussing 
the measure, but the Big Three worry that the bill would not 
help them because auto buyers would replace their American 
cars  with  foreign-made  ones.15  Freakonomics  author  Steven 
Levitt has remarked that the scheme could raise the cost of 
used cars: “If the government gives you a $4,500 voucher for a 
15-year-old car, that jacks up the future value of a 14-year-old 
car.”16 Moreover, the cost of repairing older cars might go up, 
13. “The Big Chill,” Economist, January 17, 2009. 
14. Sharon Silke Carty, “Chrysler Turns to Fiat for Strength,” USA Today, 
January 28, 2009.
15. Brody Mullins and Elizabeth Williamson, “Cash for Clunkers Plan is 
Considered,” Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2009.
16. “Editorial: cash for clunkers,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, January 28, 2008.N u m b e r   Pb0 9 - 4     f e b r u a r y   2 0 0 9
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since fewer parts will be available following the destruction of 
“clunkers.” As a result, used cars could become more expensive 
and low-income families might bear part of the burden. 
Tax Credits
Various  bills  have  been  presented  in  Congress  that  would 
provide tax credits toward the purchase of cars. The Common-
sense Auto Recovery (CAR) Act offers a tax credit equal to 
the amount of state and local sales taxes on the purchase of 
any vehicle costing less than $50,000. The Consumer Auto 
Relief (also CAR) Act would allow anyone who purchases a 
new car in 2009 to claim the purchase price of the vehicle as a 
tax deduction, up to a limit of $7,500. The stimulus package 
(The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act) provides a 
tax deduction for the sales and excise taxes on the purchase 
of any new car or light truck, but the deduction will only 
apply on the first $49,500 of the price of the vehicle, and this 
benefit is subject to some income limitations on the buyer (see 
appendix for details). Since the stimulus package was signed 
into law on February 17, 2009, the other bills are unlikely to 
get much traction now. The stimulus provisions, however, do 
not tackle the problem of access to loans for auto buyers. The 
global credit freeze is plaguing the auto industry. One option 
for remedying this would be for the government to provide 
backup insurance on auto loans, thereby reducing the risk for 
auto lenders.17 This would jump-start the auto-loan market, 
and in turn revive sales, perhaps more efficiently than a tax 
credit. 
Help for Auto-Parts Firms
In late January 2009, the auto-parts makers asked for their own 
bailout package. Hurt by falling auto sales, parts makers are 
struggling to stay afloat and have laid off thousands of work-
ers (77,000 between November 2007 and November 2008, or 
13 percent of the total auto-parts manufacturing workforce). 
They are strapped for cash since banks have stopped accepting 
notes receivable as collateral. Auto-parts firms argue that their 
collapse would not only destroy jobs, but also jeopardize the 
viability of GM’s restructuring plans. In 2008, forty auto-parts 
companies filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief.18 
Auto-parts  suppliers  have  asked  for  $25.5  billion  in 
aid. In addition, they want the government to guarantee the 
17. Peter Valdes-Dapena, “Uncle Sam Wants You to Buy a Car,” CNN Money, 
January 29, 2008. 
18. John Reed, “Car Parts Sector Looks for $10bn Federal Bailout,” Financial 
Times, January 26, 2009. 
money owed them by the Big Three. By standard contract 
terms, the Big Three have 45 days to pay their suppliers for 
parts delivered. The amount owed is estimated at between $13 
billion and $15 billion. Because of the difficulty in borrowing 
from banks using these receivables as collateral, the auto-parts 
makers want the payment period reduced to ten days. 
AUTO MEASURES IN OTHER COUNTRIES
Troubles in the auto industry are not limited to the United States. 
With auto sales throughout the world in steep decline, other 
countries are considering their own aid programs. Proposed 
measures include several different programs of consumer and 
industry assistance, in widely varying amounts. 
Canada and Mexico
The auto industries of both Canada and Mexico are highly 
dependent  on  the  US  market.  Canada-US  auto  trade  and 
Mexico-US auto trade represented 20 percent and 15 percent, 
respectively, of total bilateral trade in 2007. Around 70 percent 
of  Mexican  auto  exports  are  destined  for  the  US  market. 
Canada and Mexico are particularly vulnerable to the failing 
US industry.
The auto industry in Canada represents 14 percent of the 
country’s manufacturing output and employs 150,000 work-
ers. Canadian auto sales fell 25 percent in the month of Janu-
ary 2009.19 This decrease can be attributed in part to higher 
car prices expressed in Canadian dollars, since the Canadian 
dollar has dropped 14 percent against the US dollar since 
September 2008 and many vehicles sold in Canada are largely 
made in the United States. 
In fact, the Canadian auto industry heavily relies on the 
Big Three. On December 20, 2008, Canada announced that it 
would provide loans to GM Canada and Chrysler Canada in 
the amounts of $3 billion and $1 billion, respectively. The two 
companies must deliver their restructuring plans by Febru-
ary 20, 2009. Other measures include plans by the Canadian 
Secured Credit Facility to boost lending by purchasing $9.9 
billion (C$12 billion) of securities backed by loans and leases 
for autos and equipment.20 
Estimates  are  circulating  that  Mexican  auto  production 
could  drop  20  percent  in  2009.21  President  Calderon  has 
19. Keith Naughton, “Canadian Auto Sales Fall 25% on Declines for GM, 
Ford, Chrysler,” Bloomberg.com, February 5, 2009. 
20. Doug Alexander, “Chrysler, Ford Say Canada Leasing Program May Help 
Revive Sales,” Bloomberg.com, January 28, 2009. 
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pledged to spend $147 million (Mexican pesos 2 billion) on 
worker assistance and loans to automakers. Details are not yet 
known. 
European Union
Auto sales in European countries fell sharply in the second half 
of 2008 and the first month of 2009. In December 2008, the 
registration of new cars—a number that mirrors sales—fell 19 
percent in the European Union as a whole, year over year. This 
number masks more dramatic plunges in individual member 
countries:  62  percent  in  Ireland,  50  percent  in  Spain,  46 
percent in Denmark, and 45 percent in Sweden. The United 
Kingdom and France fared slightly better, with registration 
drops of 21 percent and 16 percent, respectively, in December 
2008, year over year. Germany witnessed a registration slump 
of around 7 percent.22 
The French auto-bailout plans will dedicate up to $7.7 
billion (€6 billion) to the failing auto industry in the form of 
credit lines. President Sarkozy insists on making aid condi-
tional on automakers’ maintaining their production on French 
soil and purchasing a certain volume of parts from French 
suppliers, to forestall the export of jobs to other countries, a 
controversial measure. 
A French Cash for Clunkers scheme was implemented in 
December 2008 and will run through the end of 2009.23 Cars 
more than 10 years old can be traded in for a voucher worth 
$1,300 (€1,000) to purchase a new car with CO2 emissions 
below 3.5 ounces per mile (oz/mile), expressed as 160 grams 
per kilometer (g/km). Renault and Peugeot are extending this 
scheme to cars more than 8 years old, and Citroen is doubling 
the value of the voucher. Some analysts have claimed that the 
measures increased sales by around 13,000 cars, compared to 
expected sales in December 2008.24 
In Germany, the government is allowing automakers to put 
their workers on reduced hours or temporary lay-off. Laid-off 
workers will receive around 60 percent of their wage from the 
Federal Labor Agency. Benefits will be paid for 18 months; after 
that workers will be let go if their company has not recovered. 
The German government also pledged to provide $2.3 billion 
Associated Press, January 12, 2009. 
22. Figures from the Association Auxiliaire de l’Automobile. 
23. “Nicolas Sarkozy Envisage une Prime de 1000 Euros Pour les Vehicules 
Mis a la Casse” (“Nicolas Sarkozy Plans a 1,000 Euro Cash for Clunkers 
Scheme”), Le Monde, December 3, 2008. Previous programs in France granted 
a $390 (€300) voucher for vehicles over 15 years old if the replacement car’s 
CO2 emissions were below 2.8 oz/mile (130 g/km). 
24. David Pearson, “French Car Registrations Fall Despite Aid by Paris,” Wall 
Street Journal, January 6, 2009. 
(€1.8 billion) in loans to Opel, a European branch of GM. 
Germany  has  put  in  place  its  own  Cash  for  Clunkers 
program in the amount of $3,300 (€2,500) for cars at least 
10 years old when replaced by a new car that meets Euro-4 
emissions standards. Although local hotlines for this scheme 
were submerged with potential applicants in the first few days, 
the real effect is unclear: German car sales for January 2009 
tumbled 14 percent compared to the previous month. 
In the United Kingdom, automakers have received $3.2 
billion  (£2.3  billion)  in  loan  guarantees,  including  $1.4 
billion  (£1  billion)  from  the  European  Investment  Bank 
(EIB). However, complaints have emerged that most of the 
funds will go to Jaguar Land Rover and Vauxhall, with little 
for auto-parts companies.25 This deal will also have an envi-
ronmental spin to it by supporting the production of more 
fuel-efficient cars.
On February 4, 2009, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlus-
coni announced the imminent release of a “sizeable” aid pack-
age to the ailing Italian auto industry, including parts makers, 
though details have not been disclosed.26 Sweden’s stimulus 
plan includes a $3.4 billion (Swedish krone 28 billion) rescue 
package for the auto industry.27 
European countries asked the European Commission to 
further relax the rules on aid to industries, but the Commis-
sion  refused.  The  Commission  is  considering  the  possible 
harmonization  of  Cash  for  Clunkers  programs.  Since  the 
value of vouchers can vary significantly, from $1,300 (€1,000) 
in  France  to  $3,300  (€2,500)  in  Germany,  there  is  a  risk 
that competition will be distorted within the single market. 
However, previous programs of a similar nature have existed 
in Europe, albeit for safety and environmental purposes, so 
the additional impact of expanded schemes to encourage the 
purchase of new cars may not be large. 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) may increase its 
lending to the automobile sector. The EIB plans to lend $5.2 
25. Robert Hutton and Mark Deen, “UK Automakers Get $3.2 Billion in 
Loan Guarantees (Update 3),” Bloomberg.com, January 27, 2009. 
26. “Update 1 – Italy Eyes ‘Sizeable’ Aide for Auto, Appliance Sector,” Reuters 
UK, February 4, 2009. 
27. Niklas Magnusson and Johan Carlstrom, “Sweden to Inject $6 Billion in 
Banks to Ease Lending (Update 3),” Bloomberg.com, February 3, 2009. 
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billion (€4 billion) a year in 2009 and 2010, with $1.3 billion 
(€1 billion) more coming from the member states and other 
European funds. European auto companies have asked for an 
additional $6.5 billion (€5 billion).28 Adding everything up, 
the companies are asking for $52 billion (€40 billion) in loans 
at reduced interest rates to finance research and development 
and comply with the new CO2-emission standards by 2015. 
Other Countries
On November 10, 2008, Australia became one of the first 
governments to announce a bailout for automakers and auto-
parts  suppliers,  in  the  amount  of  $2.3  billion  (Australian 
dollars  3.4  billion)  through  2020.29  The  bailout  plan  will 
include a “Green Car” fund to create more fuel-efficient cars 
within the next 18 months.30 The Australian auto industry 
not only has to cope with the global economic slowdown, but 
also with a halving of tariffs on imported cars to 5 percent by 
2010. 
In Japan, auto sales dropped 28 percent in January 2008, 
a 35-year low. In December 2008, the ruling Liberal Demo-
cratic Party proposed an “incentive tax scheme to promote 
fuel-efficient vehicles in Japan.” The program, which would 
start in April 2009 and last three years, would provide an indi-
vidual tax deduction of between 50 and 100 percent on the 
purchase of eligible cars. 
Nissan is expected to cut some 10,000 jobs in Japan and 
move production to lower-cost plants in foreign countries. 
The Japanese auto industry is characterized by large exports to 
foreign markets, especially the United States. Nissan and other 
Japanese car makers are suffering from a strong yen, which 
increases the price of their cars for foreign buyers. As a result 
Nissan might apply to the Development Bank of Japan for a 
low-interest loan.31 
In late December 2008, the South Korean government 
pledged to supply liquidity to auto-parts makers and to revive 
the loan market for auto purchases. Indirect methods to boost 
sales include a cut of auto excise taxes of up to 30 percent. 
However, the government vowed it would not inject capi-
28. “Bruxelles Refuse d’Assouplir ses Regles sur les Aides d’Etat au Secteur Au-
tomobile” (“Brussels Refuses to Relax its Rules on State Aid to the Automobile 
Sector”), Le Monde, January 18, 2009. 
29. The only automakers in Australia are subsidiaries of GM, Ford, and 
Toyota.
30. “Australia Car Industry gets $2.3bn Aid Package,” Reuters, November 10, 
2008. 
31. John Murphy, “Nissan to Slash Payroll, Pare Japanese Output,” Wall Street 
Journal, February 9, 2009.
tal into specific companies, so as to not violate WTO law.32 
Ssangyong Motor is currently in talks with the Seoul Central 
District Court about a bailout program.33 
While auto sales in China grew by almost 9 percent in 
January 2009 on a year over year basis, this still represents 
a sharp decline compared to a 24 percent increase in Janu-
ary 2008, year over year. As a result, the Chinese government 
announced it may cut in half the tax on second-hand car sales, 
to just 1 percent. Effective January 20, 2009, through the end 
of the year, the tax on small cars (engines smaller than 1.6 
liters) will be halved from 10 percent to 5 percent.34 
Russia raised its import duties on foreign cars starting 
January 1, 2009. The increase will remain in place for nine 
months. Given the low quality ratings of Russian cars, and 
thus a strong consumer preference for foreign cars, this has 
caused civil discontent throughout the country.35 
WTO COMPLIANCE OF US AND FOREIGN MEASURES
At the first hint of measures to assist the failing auto industry, 
European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso said 
the Europeans would watch the US plan very closely and that 
“if it amounts to illegal state aid, [the European Union] will 
act at the WTO.”36 Throughout the world, concerns have been 
heard about rising protection in the United States and abroad, 
and auto measures are often cited.37 
In June 2007, in the context of negotiations for the Doha 
Development Round, US Trade Representative (USTR) Susan 
Schwab  proposed  new  language  to  prohibit  five  additional 
subsidies under WTO rules. She explained that: 
It is time to take the next step in the development of 
stronger WTO rules that will rein in the use of industri-
al subsidies. In an increasingly global economy, foreign 
government subsidies provide an unfair competitive 
advantage. The subsidies we want to prohibit maintain 
inefficient production capacity in industries ranging 
from steel to semiconductors. Stronger rules for these 
32. “South Korea: Government Promises Automaker Aid,” Just-Auto.com, 
December 25, 2008. 
33. Kim Hyun-cheol, “No Shanghai Aid in Ssangyong’s Bailout Plan,” Korea 
Times, January 18, 2009. 
34. George Gao, “China May Cut Second-Hand Car Sales Tax to 1%,” Huliq 
News, February 4, 2009. 
35. “Russia’s New Car Import Duties Cause Billion-Dollar Damage to 
Nation’s Budget,” Pravda, January 13, 2009. 
36. “Barroso Threatens to Take US to WTO over Car Rescue Plan,” 
Europolitics, November 17, 2008. 
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types  of  subsidies  would  address  significant  trade-
distorting practices of many of our trading partners 
that often lead to unfair trade (USTR 2008).
Her quote clearly shows that, at the time, the United 
States realized the risks to the global trading system that are 
associated with aid to domestic industries. 
The subsidies proposed for listing under the prohibited 
schedule  were  the  following:  coverage  of  operating  losses; 
forgiveness of government-held debt; lending to “uncredit-
worthy” companies; equity investments in “unequityworthy” 
companies;  and  other  financing,  such  as  “royalty-based” 
financing, not on commercial terms. Had that language been 
accepted and the Doha negotiations concluded, nearly all the 
auto-bailout schemes would have clearly violated WTO rules. 
However, under current rules, the grounds for mounting a 
complaint are weaker. 
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures
Under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervail-
ing Measures (ASCM), in order to sustain a legitimate trade 
complaint, an objectionable subsidy must meet multiple tests. 
First, it must be a “financial contribution,” made “by or at 
the direction of a government or any public body within the 
territory of a Member” (WTO 1994, Article 1). Loans and 
guarantees for the auto industry easily pass this test. 
Second, the financial contribution must confer a benefit to 
the receiving parties. In other words, the loans and guarantees 
must convey to the companies an advantage that they would 
not enjoy under normal market conditions. Government loans 
to GM and Chrysler are not provided on commercial terms, 
since the interest rate on the loans is 5 percent, just 3 percent 
above the London Interbank Loan Offered Rate (LIBOR). 
If GM were to seek a loan on the commercial market today, 
the interest rate would be based on the yield on GM bonds. 
On December 19, 2008, the yield on bonds due May 2009 
was 143 percent, indicating that the market expected GM 
to default on its debt, through a restructuring program or 
bankruptcy. While GM is an extreme case, government loans 
and guarantees to auto companies around the world invari-
ably  entail  below-market  interest  or  credit-guarantee  rates. 
In short, GM, Chrysler, and other auto firms are benefitting 
from financial contributions made by governments, according 
to the language of the ASCM. 
Those two tests define the loans and guarantees to the auto 
industry as subsidies. But to be actionable under the WTO, a 
subsidy must also be “specific,” as defined in ASCM Article 2. 
The basic idea is that the public financial contribution should 
confer a benefit on an enterprise or industry, or on a group of 
enterprises and industries. Since auto loans and guarantees are 
not available to a wide spectrum of industrial enterprises, they 
clearly provide a specific subsidy. 
Finally, there is the question of trade effects. First, we 
discuss the trade effects in a hypothetical WTO case. Then we 
discuss trade effects under the US countervailing duty law. 
In a WTO case, one possibility is to show that the subsidies 
cause “serious prejudice” to imports from foreign firms. This is 
a major hurdle, since several years of data would normally be 
required to establish that imports declined on account of the 
domestic subsidies. However, an earlier case can be brought 
by showing that the subsidies cause “a threat of serious preju-
dice.”38 A subsidy that is designed to allow domestic firms to 
charge lower prices yet remain afloat will likely present a threat 
of serious prejudice. 
Complicating factors, however, are fuel-efficiency and envi-
ronmental mandates. New GM and Chrysler cars will have to 
comply with higher fuel-efficiency and CO2 standards. Higher 
standards, however, are not unique to GM and Chrysler. They 
will also apply, with some variants, to foreign firms that export 
their cars on the US market. Since those firms will not benefit 
from the new subsidies, they will arguably be put at a disadvan-
tage. Therefore, it could be claimed a threat of serious prejudice 
will be created by the terms of the US bailout package. 
If a WTO member that exports cars to the United States 
brings a case, it will be no defense, in legal terms, for the 
United States to assert that the member state in question also 
subsidizes its auto industry. In the court of public opinion, 
however, it looks bad for the pot to call the kettle black. More-
over, the United States could always bring a national counter-
vailing duty case against subsidized auto imports, setting the 
38. In the US-Brazil cotton case, Brazil argued that US cotton subsidies had 
caused “serious prejudice” and also posed a “threat of serious prejudice” in the 
future. Since the Appellate Body ruling found actual “serious prejudice” and 
demanded the removal of the subsidies, it was not necessary to rule on the 
presence of the threat. 
It would be controversial to bring a 
WTO case if the US bailout is tied to 
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stage for tit-for-tat retaliation. We discuss the countervailing 
duty scenario later in this Policy Brief.
Another consideration: It would be controversial to bring 
a WTO case if the US bailout is tied to environmental and 
fuel-efficiency conditions, since everyone agrees that greener 
cars are desirable. In fact, when criticizing the first draft of 
the US auto bailout in November 2008, the European Union 
hinted that EU schemes were safe from WTO dispute because 
they fall under exemptions from WTO subsidy disciplines for 
environmental reasons, though the European Union did not 
explain further.39 In the original ASCM, a provision stated 
that  certain  subsidies  to  promote  the  adaptation  of  exist-
ing facilities to new environmental requirements would be 
nonactionable. However, that provision expired at the end of 
1999, and without it, environmental subsidies would likely be 
considered on equal footing with other subsidies (Hufbauer, 
Charnovitz, and Kim forthcoming).
The installation of car czars might undermine US defenses 
in a hypothetical WTO case. There are two angles to the trade-
system dimensions of car czars. First, appointing someone to 
this office indirectly strengthens the ties between auto compa-
nies and the government, thereby improving the credit of auto 
companies relative to their foreign competitors. Second, the 
car czars might use their power to target sales competition 
not between the Big Three rivals, but rather against foreign 
brands. 
Broadly speaking, government control means a weaker 
orientation toward decision making based on market precepts. 
WTO disciplines are built on the ideal of a clear separation 
between government and private firms. When the separation 
disappears, the WTO system has a harder time carrying out 
its functions both as a surveillance body and as a forum for 
ensuring compliance.
For the most part, the WTO legality of foreign bailout 
schemes would follow much the same track as the discussion of 
US bailout plans, with the exception that proposals for a car czar 
39. “Possible US Auto Industry Bailout Could Face WTO Challenge by EU,” 
Inside US Trade, November 21, 2008. 
or car czars do not appear in other assistance schemes. The French 
plan, however, is unique in certain respects. As currently envis-
aged, French measures would violate both WTO and EU rules. 
Policies that favor both home-grown producers and purchases 
from French suppliers represent a clear challenge to these rules. 
EU Commissioner for Competition Nelly Kroes warned French 
President  Sarkozy  that  auto  bailouts  must  comply  with  EU 
competition policies and with EU laws on the freedom of move-
ment and capital.40 French proposals are creating strong discon-
tent, especially in the Czech Republic, as French car companies 
are being asked to shut down their factories in Eastern Europe.41 
Moreover, by forcing French companies to produce in France, 
President Sarkozy could potentially impose higher costs on auto 
manufacturers when domestic components are more expensive 
than foreign ones—a result that would clearly not improve the 
competitive position of the French auto industry. 
US Countervailing Duty Law
Some foreign measures could be actionable under US coun-
tervailing duty (CVD) law. There would be many similarities 
between a WTO ASCM case and a US CVD case, reflecting 
the fact that the United States played a large role in shaping 
the ASCM. The tests of financial contribution, benefit, and 
specificity all apply, but the trade-effects tests are different. 
Moreover, in a US CVD case, it is an industry that brings the 
case, rather than a government as under the WTO ASCM. 
A countervailable subsidy occurs when a public author-
ity from a foreign country provides a financial contribution, 
defined as “the direct transfer of funds, such as grants, loans, 
and equity infusions, or the potential direct transfer of funds 
or liabilities, such as loan guarantees.”42 Foreign auto-assis-
tance measures that provide loans or loan guarantees clearly 
fall within this definition. 
The next step is to establish that there has been a benefit 
conferred to the industry receiving the loans or the loan guar-
antees. Since all foreign schemes that involve loans and loan 
guarantees provide reduced interest rates, they are not given 
on commercial terms, and thus they provide a clear benefit.
Finally, foreign loans and guarantees easily pass the speci-
ficity test of the US CVD law: “Where the authority providing 
the subsidy…expressly limits access to the subsidy to an enter-
prise or industry, the subsidy is specific as a matter of law.” 
The trade effects are where US CVD laws differ from a 
40. David Gow, “EU Threatens Legal Action over American Car Industry 
Bailout,” Guardian, February 3, 2009.
41. Ben Hall, George Parker, and Norma Cohen, “Brown Furious over 
Sarkozy VAT Attack,” Financial Times, February 7, 2009. 
42. See US Code Title 19, Chapter 4, Subtitle IV, Section 1677 (5). 
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WTO ASCM case. The CVD impact tests are “material injury” 
or “threat of material injury.” The terms are loosely defined in 
the statute, and past cases do not draw a bright line to define 
“material injury.” However, the decided cases do show that 
“threat” is fairly easy to demonstrate. 
Therefore, if the US auto industry brought a countervailing 
duty case to the US Department of Commerce and the Interna-
tional Trade Commission, it would likely pass all the tests needed 
to be considered a countervailable subsidy. An affirmative find-
ing by both agencies would lead to the imposition of a CVD 
duty on imported auto merchandise. Thereafter, the targeted 
country could chose to mount a challenge in the US courts and 
the WTO. However, the case could take two or three years to 
resolve, and duties would be imposed in the meantime. 
Cash for Clunkers and Tax Credits
Cash for Clunkers programs and tax credits do not qualify 
as actionable subsidies under either the WTO ASCM or US 
CVD laws because they do not confer an advantage on domes-
tic firms. The Cash for Clunkers plans do not mandate that 
the voucher be spent on domestically produced cars. Similarly, 
tax credits are not limited to the purchase of national brands. 
Therefore, they do not benefit domestic auto manufacturers 
over imported brands. 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF THE AUTO 
INDUSTRY
Political realism suggests that a WTO auto case against the Unit-
ed States, or any other country, is unlikely, since most countries 
with large auto industries have anticipated or echoed US auto 
measures. The threat of a WTO case would be most plausible 
if brought by a country that has not followed the lead of the 
United States in aiding its auto industry. For example, Spain 
and Brazil, which both ranked among the top ten motor vehicle 
producers in the world in 2008, have not yet implemented 
measures to help their auto industries (International Organi-
zation of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 2007).43 However, for 
assorted geopolitical reasons, the chances of a WTO case being 
brought by one of those “innocent” countries seem remote.
A CVD case seems more likely, but the nature of the 
industry will limit the number of occurrences. The industry 
is characterized by a large amount of cross ownership among 
companies, so it is improbable that there will be many CVD 
cases brought to US courts or other national courts. If a case 
43. It is worth noting that neither Spain nor Brazil is a large exporter of motor 
vehicles.
were brought to a national court, the remedy would not force 
the accused country to change its laws; it would simply impose 
a countervailing duty on exports to the affected market. 
The greater risk is that the auto industry will become an 
industry that removes itself from WTO discipline. Govern-
ments of all major auto producers may resort to public loans, 
guarantees, vouchers, and tax credits to support and nourish 
their  industries.  Countries  would  then  essentially  set  their 
own benchmarks for permissible subsidies, determined by the 
push and pull of domestic political considerations and with 
little regard for the global marketplace. 
This would not be a novel phenomenon. For decades, the 
shipbuilding industry has been characterized by high govern-
ment  intervention,  owing  both  to  strong  cyclicality—the 
boom of 2007 quickly became the bust of 2008—and the 
political imperative of supporting national shipyards. Since 
most shipbuilding countries play the subsidy game, discipline 
is very weak.44 Yet attempts have been made: In December 
1994, the main shipbuilding nations signed the “Agreement 
Respecting Normal Competitive Conditions in the Commer-
cial Shipbuilding and Repair Industry” under the auspices of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD).45 But the agreement never entered into force 
because the United States refused to ratify it. The European 
Union launched other attempts, again in the context of the 
OECD, to reach an agreement between 26 countries, repre-
senting 95 percent of world shipping capacity, but negotiations 
stalled in 2005. To this day, the shipbuilding sector remains 
virtually outside multilateral regulation. 
Steel is another industry with traditionally high levels of 
subsidies, protection, and buy-national rules. This shows up 
in public support for steel mills in China, higher tariffs in 
India, and recently introduced Buy American provisions in 
the stimulus bill passed by the US House of Representatives 
on January 28, 2009 (Hufbauer and Schott 2009). Similar 
measures on steel and other industries either have been already 
44. For a discussion of the difficulties of applying the WTO ASCM and Anti-
Dumping Agreement to the shipbuilding industry, see European Commission 
(2009). 
45. Signatory countries were the European Communities, Finland, Japan, 
Korea, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. 
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adopted or are being considered in Argentina, China, Ecua-
dor, India, Indonesia, and Russia.46 
Subsidies have also been the rule of the game in the aircraft 
industry. The civil aircraft sector is concentrated in the United 
States and Europe, with activity in Canada, Brazil, and a few 
other countries. In 1992, the United States and Europe took 
regulation into their own hands and signed the Agreement on 
Large Civil Aircraft. The agreement placed limits on certain 
government support, including limiting subsidies to one third 
of the costs of developing a new aircraft. But the agreement was 
terminated in 2004. Since then the United States and the Euro-
pean Union have each launched cases against the other using 
the WTO dispute system. 
Protection through subsidies is perhaps most egregious 
in agriculture. Developing countries, where agriculture still 
represents a large share of GDP, are trying to obtain market 
access to rich-country markets for their commodities. But rich 
countries are prey to strong farm lobbies, and despite round 
after round of multilateral negotiations, agriculture remains 
highly subsidized and protected. 
CONCLUSION
Auto bailouts in the United States and elsewhere largely fall 
within  the  purview  of  the  WTO  definition  of  actionable 
subsidies.  But  fuel-efficiency  and  environmental  standards 
complicate the issue, and bringing a case to the WTO based 
on environmental mandates would be hard to justify politi-
cally. Moreover, since virtually all major auto exporters have 
implemented some auto industry aid, any country that brings 
the first case to the WTO can expect to be challenged with a 
case against their own auto measures. Therefore, it is unlikely 
that WTO cases will arise on auto-assistance measures.
National CVDs are more likely. However, any country 
that became the target of a US CVD case would probably not 
abandon the subsidy in response to the duties imposed against 
its exports. The target country would simply limit its exports 
to  the  United  States.  This  would  probably  be  followed  by 
measures targeting US auto firms. Therefore, even a success-
ful US CVD case would likely serve to fragment global auto 
markets even further, not a desirable outcome. 
As auto bailouts and aid continue and intensify without 
WTO  challenges,  the  world  auto  industry  could  gradually 
leave the realm of WTO discipline. This would set a danger-
ous precedent. If an important industry, like autos, can take 
itself out of WTO disciplines, the world trading system will 
be seriously weakened. Instead, G-20 leaders should proclaim 
46. David Gow, “EU Threatens Legal Action over American Car Industry 
Bailout,” Guardian, February 3, 2009. 
a vision of restoring “normal market conditions” to both the 
auto industries and others that are now heavily subsidized.47 
APPENDIX: US AUTO ASSISTANCE MEASURES UNDER 
CONSIDERATION
The Auto Industry Financing and Restructuring Act 
(H.R. 7321)
The  bill,  introduced  December  10,  2008,  unblocked  $17.4 
billion total in aid to automakers: $13.4 billion for GM and 
Chrysler now, and another $4 billion for GM when the second 
half of the TARP funds are released. The money comes from 
funds previously appropriated for Section 136 of the Energy 
Independence and Security Act. The funds are in the form of a 
bridge loan to the companies in question until March 31, 2009, 
and must be paid back within 7 years, with 5 percent interest 
over the first 5 years and 9 percent interest over the last 2 years 
if they become permanent.
The bill creates a position for someone within the Execu-
tive Branch to be designated by the president (the president’s 
designee,  or  car  czar)  who  will  oversee  and  negotiate  the 
restructuring of the companies that receive the funds. 
Each auto company must provide its restructuring plan 
by March 31, 2009. If the designee does not agree with the 
plan, he or she can put forward his or her own and present it 
to Congress. If no plan is put forward by the auto company 
by March 31, 2009, and the designee’s plan is not approved 
within 30 days of that date, the loan will be recalled.
The  restructuring  plan  will  not  be  approved  unless  it 
complies with applicable fuel-efficiency and emissions require-
ments. In addition, the designee may accelerate repayment 
of a loan or cancel other financial assistance if the auto firm 
fails to comply with applicable fuel-efficiency and emissions 
requirements after March 31, 2009.
The bill includes the following protections for taxpayers:
n  The bill mandates super seniority of this loan above all 
others. Companies must pledge all available security and 
collateral against the loans.
n  The bill requires a warranty of 20 percent of the value 
of the loan in the form of nonvoting common stock or 
preferred stock.
n  The bill places limits on executive compensation: all the 
47. The Group of 20 includes: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, 
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restrictions of the TARP, plus no bonuses or incentives 
to the 25 most highly paid employees, stringent prohibi-
tions on golden parachutes, and no compensation that 
could encourage manipulation of reported earnings. 
n  The bill prohibits the payment of dividends.
n  In the event of bankruptcy, the debts to the government 
from the financial assistance will not be dischargeable.
n  Auto firms must divest and may not own or lease any 
private passenger aircrafts.
National Incentive Program for Voluntary Retirement 
of Fuel-Inefficient Vehicles, Cash for Clunkers (S. 247)
The  bill,  introduced  January  14,  2009,  aims  to  accelerate 
fuel savings nationwide by providing incentives to registered 
owners of high fuel-consumption automobiles to replace such 
automobiles with more fuel-efficient automobiles or public 
transportation.  The  program  would  last  four  years,  from 
2009 to 2012. Eligible drivers would receive a reimbursement 
voucher for the purchase of a new or used vehicle. If the retired 
vehicle was made before 1998, the voucher would amount to 
$2,000, while vehicles from 1999–2001 would get $3,000 
and any vehicles made after 2002 would get $4,500. 
The program is subject to the following conditions:
n  The car traded in must be drivable, have a fuel-economy 
rating of less than 18 miles per gallon, and have been 
registered for at least the past 120 days. Once traded in, 
the old vehicles would be taken apart for scrap.
n  The  new  or  used  vehicle  purchased  with  the  voucher 
must have a fuel-economy rating that exceeds the CAFE 
target for that class of vehicle by at least 25 percent, an 
MSRP of less than $45,000, a model year 2004 or later, 
and meet or exceed federal emissions standards. A person 
can also claim the equivalent dollar amount in public- 
transit fares. 
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (H.R. 1)
The stimulus bill, signed into law on February 17, 2009, provides 
a tax benefit for new cars and light trucks (no more than 8,500 
pounds) purchased between the day the bill becomes law and 
December 31, 2009. The bill allows individuals purchasing an 
eligible vehicle to deduct the amount of the sales and excise 
taxes applicable on the first $49,500 of the purchase price of the 
vehicle. Any amount that exceeds this limit will be taxed. To be 
eligible, the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income must not exceed 
$125,000, or $250,000 in the case of a joint return.
The Commonsense Auto Recovery (CAR) Act (H.R. 100)
The bill, introduced January 6, 2009, would amend the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1986 to create a tax credit equal to the 
amount of state and local sales taxes on the purchase of a new 
or used passenger vehicle. Any individual or small-business 
owner is eligible for the credit, which applies to all cars with 
an MSRP of less than $50,000.
Consumer Auto Relief Act (H.R. 385)
The bill, also introduced January 9, 2009, would amend the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide tax incentives to 
consumers and lenders for the purchase of a new passenger 
vehicle during 2009. Anyone who purchases a car in 2009 can 
claim the purchase price of the vehicle as a tax deduction in 
the amount of $7,500 if the vehicle is placed in service during 
the  90  day  period  beginning  on  the  day  of  the  enactment, 
$5,000 if placed in service within another 90 days, and $2,500 
otherwise.
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